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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : The Peacetime/Wartime Transition Problem

1. The basic problem flagged in [] 18 . 25X1
March memorandum, which Ed Proctor forwarded to you on
19 March, and in my 22 March note forwarding General
Sitton's expression of appreciation; is defined by four
questions:

(1) What is the role of the DCI in a wartime
situation, or in [a] period of ~~capital-C~~ crisis in which
there is a serious, imminent possibility of general
war? ~~or a threat to US interests.~~

(2) What is the role of the national intelligence
structure and, particularly, the CIA in such a wartime/
capital-C crisis period?

(3) What mechanisms and procedures will support
the DCI in playing his (now-undefined) role in such a
situation?

(4) Through what mechanisms and procedures will
the CIA support (1) the DCI and (2) the national
effort in such a situation?

2. At this writing, none of the four questions has
an answer -- hence, the problem. This problem has existed

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for 29 years, unresolved because it has never been squarely addressed. (Taking hold of it would inevitably require grasping a number of ~~politically~~ prickly nettles which, to date, no administration, DCI or Secretary of Defense has ever wanted to grasp.) The problem has two main roots:

(1) The intelligence portions of the legislation establishing the DCI and the CIA -- i.e., the National Security Act of 1947 and the CIA Act of 1949 -- address their respective roles in a peacetime environment. ^{This legislation} ~~It~~ does not address the roles of the DCI or the CIA in wartime, hence, these roles are not specified, clarified or even defined.


(2) The US military establishment's planning (both in doctrine and procedures) for wartime and capital-C crisis periods ~~(in which there is a real, imminent possibility of war)~~ is founded on the military's concept of the "National Command Authority" (NCA). The NCA is seen as a line running from the service chiefs through the Chairman, JCS, to the Secretary of Defense and -- through him -- to the President, as Commander-in-Chief. This NCA concept makes minimal provision for the role of the NSC (e.g., the input of the Secretary of State) or its various subcommittees (e.g., the WSAG or the OPSAG). It makes no ^{Conceptual} provision for the DCI.

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3. Two recent major command exercises (involving a general war scenario) have highlighted certain concrete manifestations of the above:

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Sent*
4. Two sets of events, now in train, are going to compound ~~this problem~~ *these problems*:

-- The military services are moving briskly in setting up their World Wide Military Command and Control

*It also surfaced some more general, basic problems relating to the whole US Government, not just the Intelligence Community. I will discuss these with you separately.

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(WWMCCS) in the Pentagon, folding in a DIA-controlled intelligence component ^(the National Military Intelligence Center - NMIC) and both developing and touting it as the device which should support national decision-making in time of war or capital-C crisis. The DCI/CIA is not really part of this structure, which more or less assumes that CIA assets (at least CIA collection resources) will be placed under the WWMCCS in time of crisis -- if not in form, at least in substance via the WWMCCS assuming the right to task them.

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5. What Is To Be Done

Though the perception (reflected in your 20 March note) of an obligation to get off dead center on this -- where we have been for almost three decades -- is sound, this is also

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a problem involving a number of complex issues, in whose resolution less haste will produce more speed. Fairly soon you will want to engage the CFI on this ^(matter) ^{the CFI} for it provides what has never before existed: a forum through which some resolution can be worked out. You will also want to talk with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, and -- eventually -- the President. We would suggest, however, that your line of march be as follows:

-- First, convene Messrs. Proctor, Duckett, Nelson, Knoche, Lehman and Carver to discuss this whole ^{set} ~~issue~~, ^{their} ~~its~~ background, and ^{their} ~~its~~ ramifications with you.

-- Second, set up a small task force with appropriate representation from DDI, DDS&T, DDO, the IC Staff and the present NIO structure to give you, privately, an analysis of the issues and optional paths which could lead to their resolution.

-- After you have sorted out in your own mind how you want to proceed and where you want to go, ~~the~~ the CFI and the Community can be effectively and efficiently engaged to develop a set of recommendations (some of which could require legislation) which could be presented to the President and the NSC.

6. This memorandum was checked in draft with Messrs. Proctor, Duckett, Nelson, Knoche and Lehman. It reflects our joint views.

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TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE
1	DDO	25 MAR 1976
2	25X1	
3	[Redacted]	26 Mar 76
4		
5	DDO	
6		

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

1-3: Pls give me any comment
by Co D Friday

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE